PROPOSAL FOR A LABOR-MANAGEMENT BOARD
AND A CHARTER OF FAIR LABOR PRACTICES*
LLoYD K. GAmuSONt

I
HE proposal outlined in this article relates only to the development of policies and procedures for the avoidance and settlement
of major industrial conflicts. It is not advanced either as a substitute for, or as a supplement to, legislation designed to deal with real or
imagined union abuses. It is intended to stand on its own feet. I venture to
prophesy that any legislation which Congress is likely to enact in this session, of the sort heretofore introduced, will not help to avoid the serious
strikes which are the chief object of public concern. Indeed, as I shall indicate a little later, some of the pending proposals, if they were to become
law, would be likely to increase rather than to allay unrest. I shall not
attempt, however, either to analyze the pending legislation or to discuss
what might appropriately be done to check certain improper practices
which some unions have engaged in, because I do not wish to divert attention from what seems to me to be the heart of the problem.
I would state that problem as follows: What can be done to avoid major
industrial conflicts in which there are involved no elements of wrongdoing
* This article contains the substance of a memorandum which I prepared in January, x947,
and circulated among a small group of industrialists and labor leaders with whom I was
personally acquainted. The responses were favorable, but the industrialists were in general
preoccupied with the enactment of legislation aimed against particular practices on the part
of some unions and aimed also at the size and power of unions; and they expressed doubts as
to the willingness of the leaders of industry and labor to give the necessary time to the work
of a joint board such as this proposal envisages. Subsequently the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development issued on February 24, 1947, a public
statement on "Collective Bargaining: How To Make It More Effective," and in this statement
the Committee recommended, among other things, the establishment of a labor-management council substantially along the lines of the proposal herein discussed but with some
differences worth noting, to which I shall draw attention. The point is that the Research and
Policy Committee of the C.E.D., consisting of twenty-one leading industrialists, including
such men as Paul G. Hoffman (chairman of the C.E.D.), Beardsley Rural, Eric Johnston,
Jay C. Hormel, Fowler McCormick, Philip D. Reed, and others, have gone on record in favor
of the establishment by the government of a joint board of leaders of industry and labor to
promote industrial peace by joint agreement from time to time upon policies and procedures.
I submit that if Congress were to establish such an agency, top-notch men could be found to
serve upon it.

t Member of the firm of Paul, Weiss, Wharton and Garrison, New York; formerly Dean
of University of Wisconsin Law School, and General Counsel and later Executive Director and Vice-Chairman of the National War Labor Board.
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but only the question of what the terms of employment should be? I shall
assume that any legislation which is likely to be enacted will not materially affect either the power or the philosophy of the labor and industrial
groups which now confront each other in the basic industries, and that
therefore the problem, as I have posed it, will continue to be with us for a
long time to come. Indeed, it seems to me to be inherent in the environment. You cannot today have big industry without big unions, and wherever you have the combination of the two you will run the risk of large
and protracted strikes over the terms of employment; and no amount of
legislation dealing with such matters as secondary boycotts, jurisdictional
disputes, breaches of contract, dosed shop, and the like, will bring us any
closer to a solution of the difficulty.
In the search for a solution I believe that we must place primary
reliance upon the capacity of industry and labor to hammer out, by agreement, policies and procedures which will keep the conflicts over terms of
employment within reasonable bounds. I do not believe that legislation
can accomplish this. We can only make progress the hard way-by agreement. That does not mean, however, that the government should just sit
back, do nothing and hope for the best. On the contrary, government can
and should exercise initiative and leadership in bringing the leaders of
industry and labor together in a functional relationship designed to bring
about a maximum degree of agreement.
The proposal herein outlined is directed to that end. I should like to
state a little more fully the premises on which it rests. They are:
(i) The major issue in the large-scale industrial disputes of today is the
wage issue. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the question of the closed or union
shop versus the open shop was very much to the fore and was greatly
troubling the country, but it was put to rest during the war by the maintenance of membership compromise evolved by the National War Labor
Board.' Since the war, employers and unions have for the most part been
able to work out compromises of their own through collective bargaining
in cases where the union shop or the closed shop has been refused by the
employers. These compromises have generally involved either some form
zUnder the War Labor Board's standard form of maintenance of membership, the union
members in a plant had fifteen days in which to withdraw voluntarily from the union if they
did not wish to be bound to remain members during the balance 6f the contract period. Those
who did not withdraw during the fifteen days were bound to remain in the union as a condition'
of employment. Non-union employees were not required to join the union. The employer was
free to hire whomever he wished. Employees who voluntarily joined the union after the lapse
,of the fifteen-day period were required to remain in the union for the balance of the contract
period. Often some form of check-off (voluntary and revocable, or voluntary and irrevocable,
or mandatory for all union members) was directed in addition to maintenance of membership.
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of maintenance of membership or some form of check-off2 or both. Not one
of the important post-war strikes has been fought over questions of union
security. They -have been primarily concerned with wages: first in relation
to the cutback of hours to the normal peacetime work week, which resulted in a substantial reduction in weekly earnings; 3 and subsequently
in relation to the cost of living. If we could make progress in evolving
formulae and standards for the determination of wage levels in different
industries and in different areas, the greatest single cause of industrial
conflicts would be obviated. These formulae and standards can, I believe,
only be evolved by agreement.
(2) While controversies over wages are the most prolific source of industrial conflict today and while ways of settling these controversies without
costly stoppages must continue to be the primary objective of national
policy, attention must be given to other important questions which frequently result in strife. The union security issue is still troublesome in
many plants. The determination of the line between those functions
which should be exclusively managerial and those in which the union
should participate gives rise to many sharp controversies and needs intensive study. As workers grope for security, questions of guaranteed annual
2 Including in some instances check-offs of an amount equivalent to the union dues, applicable to all employees, whether union members or not. This type of agreement, which has
received its most prominent form in the so-called Rand Plan in Canada, worked out by Judge
Rand in the settlement of the Ford strike at Windsor, proceeds on the theory that since all
employees benefit from the collective agreement negotiated by the union and from the grievance machinery maintained jointly by the union and the employer, they ought to pay their
share of the upkeep of the union, during the life of the contract. The same theory, of course, is
advanced as an argument in favor of the closed shop or the union shop agreement, but these
agreements, in addition to making every worker pay dues, require them to keep up their membership in the union in good standing, and thus give the union a strong disciplinary control
over the members. This control may be exercised to discourage dual unionism in the plant,
and in that respect its exercise promotes industrial peace and is to the interests of the employer as well as the union. On the other hand, the power of discipline may be abused as a
result of union politics or personal antagonisms, and many employers object strongly to discharging men for reasons other than the non-payment of dues. The check-off, whether applied
to union members only or to all employees, relieves the employer from ever having to discharge anyone. At the same time it does tend to weaken the authority of the union, which
may be needed not only to discourage organizing campaigns by outside unions but to help
police the agreement by disciplining persons responsible for wildcat stoppages and other
breaches of contract. It should be noted, in addition, that some unions oppose the check-off
because it does away with the monthly contact between the union officials and the members,
particularly where, as is often the case, the members are supposed to go to union headquarters
to pay their dues. There are other unions, however, which strongly favor the check-off because by relieving the stewards and committeemen from having to collect dues, they can devote more time to the handling of grievances.
3 The strikes in the automotive, steel, and other basic industries in the winter and spring
of 1946 primarily resulted in compromising the loss in weekly take-home pay at figures which
resulted in the absorption by the companies of anywhere from one-half to three-fourths of the
loss, through increases in hourly rates.
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wages, severance pay, pension plans, and the like are beginning to come
to the fore. In-plant relationships and procedures for the settlement of
grievances and the promotion of worker morale are assuming a new importance as we learn more about the psychological factors which produce
unrest. In all these fields there is urgent need of labor-industry co-operation at the highest levels of national leadership as well as all along the
line.
(3) Governmental determination of wages and other terms of employment in major industries, whether brought about through boards or
courts, and whether through legal compulsion or public pressure, will
undermine collective bargaining and may in the end result in governmental controls over prices and production.
It would be difficult to conduct a limited experiment with governmental
intervention of this sort. Proposals have been made for establishing compulsory arbitration only in industries particularly charged with a public
interest, such as electric power production; but it would be hard to do this
without extending the process throughout the basic industries such as
coal, steel, railroads, shipping, communications, oil, and others, the stoppage of any one of which would sooner or later vitally affect the country.
Compulsory arbitration upon any such scale would introduce a dangerous
degree of governmental interference with the flexibility of the wage-price
structure, which is the present basis of our whole economy. Moreover, as
a long experience in Australia and experiments in Great Britain in the first
World War have abundantly demonstrated, compulsory arbitration often
fails to work because, in a democracy, masses of men simply cannot be
prevented from striking when they believe that a particular governmental
decision is unfair or unjust.
The plain fact of the matter is that so long as we have a democracy and
a system of relatively free enterprise, we are bound to have a certain
amount of industrial strife which will be greater in some periods and less
in others; and it would seem to be the better part of wisdom to look to
collective bargaining,, imperfect as its results may be, to settle the differences that arise than to embrace another imperfect method of settlement, namely, compulsory arbitration, which carries with it much evil of
its own. No doubt we may be faced occasionally with strikes of such a
magnitude and duration as to threaten the welfare of the whole community, but it would seem better to meet an occasional crisis of this sort
by improvised methods of settlement, as we have managed to do in the
past, than to hold out in advance to the contestants an assured procedure
for getting the government to write a contract for them. After all, we have
weathered each crisis thus far by one means or another adapted to the par-

A LABOR-MANAGEMENT BOARD

ticular emergency, without embarking upon formidable adventures in the
way of governmental dictation of the terms of employment, and I see no
reason to suppose that we cannot continue to get along in this way in the
future.
We must always remember that, after all, industrial workers are a part
of the public; they are average Americans who are profoundly influenced
by what their community wants and thinks. In this fact lies our ultimate
safety. And we must remember also that throughout most of industry our
labor relations have scarcely emerged from the formative stage and that
the curve of development for a long time to come will be in the direction of
greater maturity and responsibility, with wisdom building upon experience. The time is therefore ripe for a forward effort on the part of the
leaders of industry and labor to develop policies and procedures which
will make collective bargaining work more effectively.
(4) The objective of national policy should therefore be to buttress and
support the processes of free collective bargaining. The best and perhaps
the only way in which fundamental progress can be made in this direction
is by encouraging common agreement and joint efforts on the part of the
representatives of industry and labor nationally, and in local communities, and in particular industries. Toward this end the government should
give all the aid it can, short of interfering in the final determination of
policies and decisions.
(5) Progress in the formulation of overall policies by agreement was
made through national management-labor conferences called by the President at the start of World Wars I and II, and in November, 1945. However, the fruits of this progress have been insufficiently capitalized upon.
In particular the unanimous agreements reached by the conference of
November, 1945, deserve to be proclaimed as national policy, and to be
added to thereafter by joint effort.
(6) The experience of the National War Labor Boards in World Wars I
and II, in reaching unanimous agreement upon many important questions
of basic policy, demonstrated the utility of a continuing, organized relationship between representatives of industry and labor. A similar continuing, organized relationship may prove beneficial in peacetime and
may hold out more promise of progress by agreement than reliance exclusively upon occasional ad hoc management-labor conferences.
The proposal outlined herein is designed to establish a relationship of
that sort. Before taking it up, I should like to discuss briefly a portion of
the pending Taft-Ball-Smith Bill 4 which deals with the problem of settling
and avoiding major strikes. I select this measure for comment only be4 S. 55, 8oth Cong. Ist Sess. (X947).
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cause it seems to me to be typical of many attempts to set up governmental machinery for the avoidance of strikes, involving some elements of
compulsion, which I fear will have effects in practice quite contrary to
those intended by the draftsmen.
Title I of this bill creates a five-man all-public mediation board "in the
Department of Labor." The existing Conciliation Service is put under it.5
Section 3 (b) provides in effect that whenever the board proffers its services
in any labor dispute there shall be no strike or lockout for sixty days (unless prior thereto the board certifies that its efforts at mediation are concluded-a confession of failure which one may expect would not often be
made). This plausible provision is likely to have these unforeseen consequences:
(a) It would be to the interest of every union entering upon negotiations
to get the board to proffer its services at the earliest possible moment.
For if the union and the company negotiated for two or three months
without reaching a settlement, the board could intervene on the eve of a
strike and prolong the period for another two months. In order to avoid
such a stretching out of the negotiations, the union would be likely at the
very outset to try to get the board into the picture so that the sixty-day
period would begin to run, after which the union would have a free hand.
The way to do this would be to make exorbitant demands and noisy
threats, so as to give the appearance of an imminent crisis.
(b) These tactics would then gravely disturb the collective-bargaining
atmosphere. They would stiffen the employer's resistance and make it
harder for the union to recede from its extreme demands.
(c) Once the board had proffered its services, it would tend to develop
into a fact-finding, recommendatory agency, making public reports on the
merits of unsettled controversies and putting the government to that extent into the business of determining wages and other conditions of employment. 6 Certainly there would be a good deal of public pressure on the
board to state its position in controversies which were upsetting to the
sBeing "in the Department of Labor" means, among other things, that the board's budget
would be controlled by the Secretary of Labor. The proposal really amounts to no more than
adding five good Presidential appointees to the Conciliation Service to head it up. This is a
net gain, but not much, because under the set-up it would be difficult to get really first-rate
men to serve. The apparent independence of the board would not be real because of the
Secretary's budgetary control, and conflicts, jealousy, and friction would be likely to arise
between the Secretary, whose prestige would be diminished by the bill, and the five Presidential
appointees who would be injected into his establishment.
61 do not wish to suggest that the appointment of fact-finding boards would not sometimes
be useful. If carefully selected on an ad hoc basis, and used sparingly, and only where there was
good reason to expect that they might succeed as a sort of dressed-up mediation board or as a
face-saving instrument, they could continue to do good work, as they have done in the past.

A LABOR-MANAGEMENT BOARD

public, and the board would be tempted to take this course whenever it
had failed to effect a settlement. And those unions which think they can
gain most by getting governmental agencies to recommend terms beyond
what the employer would offer would do their utmost to get the board to
make reports of this sort.
(d) Because of the risk that labor disputes would terminate in this sort
of semi-adjudication by the board, employers might become chary of making any proposals to the union in negotiations which could be used as a
floor above which the board would build. Thus collective bargaining
would be undermined.
None of these results might actually occur. But our experience to date
with governmental cooling-off periods and other forms of governmental
intervention indicates that there would be enough danger in this type of
proposal to warrant the adoption of an alternative policy designed to
bring about the maximum degree of co-operation between the leaders of
industry and labor in the development of policies and procedures for
settling and avoiding major conflicts.
II
The outline of an Act of Congress which now follows is suggested as one
way of translating that policy into practice. I have not attempted to put
this outline into formal statutory language, but only to indicate what its
salient features might be.
OUTLINE OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS

I. Purposes of the Act
The purposes of this Act are to facilitate the avoidance and settlement
of industrial disputes by collective agreements between unions and employers without strikes or lockouts, and to provide means for assisting and
encouraging representatives of labor and management to develop through
joint efforts policies and procedures designed to make collective bargaining function effectively in the public interest.
II. Establishment of a National Labor-Management Board
A. A National Labor-Management Board is hereby created as an independent agency of the government, to be composed of the following:
(i) Five representatives of labor, each with an alternate, to be appointed by the President after consultation with the major organizations
of labor;
(2) Five representatives of industry, each with an alternate, to be ap-
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pointed by the President after consultation with the major organizations
of industry;
(3) A chairman, to be jointly nominated by the foregoing members and
appointed by the President;
(4) The Secretaries of Labor and Commerce, ex officio;
(5) The chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Labor, ex
officio. 7
B. Any action of the board may be taken by, and no action may be
taken without, the affirmative vote of four of the five labor members and
four of the five industry members.
C. The labor and industry members, and the chairman, will be appointed for one year terms, and may be eligible for reappointment. They
will serve on a per diem basis, with a full-time executive secretary.
D. The board may call upon the secretaries of Labor and Commerce
from time to time for special staff assistance, research and investigations,
and may appoint such additional personnel as is needed to enable the
board to carry out its duties.
E. The duties of the board shall be as follows:
(i) To consider ways and means of developing and supporting voluntary procedures for the avoidance and settlement of strikes, in general,
and also in particular industries, areas and communities, as the needs may
indicate;
(2) To study the causes of industrial peace as well as industrial unrest,
and to bring to the attention of industry, labor and the public, any lessons
learned through such study, including in the study an analysis of local or
industry-wide experiments and procedures for the avoidance and settlement of disputes, with a view to encouraging the wider adoption of methods which have proved successful in practice;
(3) To promote more effective methods for arbitrating jurisdictional
disputes;
7The C.E.D. proposal is for a Labor-Management Council within the Department of
Labor "for housekeeping purposes" but independent as to its operations and policies. Its
members (unspecified as to number) would be appointed by the President "upon the joint
recommendation of the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor with the advice and consent of the
Senate" (a pretty neat suggestion). The two Secretaries and the Chairmen of the Senate and
House Committees on Labor would not, as in my draft, be ex officio members, but the Council
would be required to meet with them "at regular intervals .... so that there may be a continuing and direct contact between the executive and legislative branches of government and the
representatives of labor and management on matters affecting industrial peace." The C.E.D.
proposal contains no provision for a chairman, which seems to me to be a lack, since there ought
to be some one on the board charged with responsibility for seeing to it that the board met
regularly and that its business moved along.
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(4) To study the experience with labor-management production committees during the war, and other experiments in co-operation for the improvement of efficiency and productivity, and to encourage the taking of
appropriate further steps in these directions;
(5) To appoint arbitrators or emergency boards or investigators at the
joint request of the parties to particular disputes certified to the board
by the Secretary of Labor as vitally affecting the national welfare;
(6) In disputes so certified, to recommend to the parties or to the President, on the board's own motion, particular courses of action or procedures
for settlement, not involving the board in the merits of the dispute or in
findings of fact, whenever in the board's judgment such recommendations
can usefully be made and need to be made in the public interest;8
(7) In aid of its duties, to hold hearings or conferences, conduct investigations and issue publications;
(8) To recommend any legislation which in the board's judgment may
be needed for the proper functioning or strengthening of the board or for
the support of voluntarily developed procedures for the settlement of disputes; to report its activities annually to Congress; and to submit its views
to Congress or the President upon particular questions when requested so
to do;
(9) To encourage adherence by unions and employers to the principles
unanimously adopted by the President's National Labor-Management
Conference of November, 1945, regarding the making of initial collective
agreements, and the administration and maintenance of collective agree8 The major differences between the C.E.D. proposal and the foregoing, with regard to
functions, are as follows: (a) the C.E.D. proposal omits item (4) having to do with the promotion of efficiency and productivity-a note I should like to see included; (b) the C.E.D. proposal omits item (5) relating to the appointment of arbitrators, etc., at the joint request of the
parties, and item (6) relating to procedural recommendations for the settlement of a limited
group of critical controversies. The C.E.D. would have the council stay out of disputes altogether. At present, as a result of the action taken in November, 1945, by the President's National Labor-Management Conference, there is attached to the U.S. Conciliation Service a
joint labor-management advisory board which passes on appointments of arbitrators and
mediators. The C.E.D. would in effect lift the level of the Director of the Conciliation Service
and of this advisory board by having both appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, and would then broaden the duties of the joint board by having it make studies and
meet with the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce and the House and Senate Labor Committee
chairmen, as already described, and make an annual report to the President with recommendations for improving industrial relations. The joint board, or council, as the C.E.D. would
call it, would continue to pass on appointments of arbitrators and mediators, but it would not
appoint them itself, nor would it undertake any direct functions, however limited, in labor
disputes. My own preference would be to leave the Conciliation Service intact with its present
joint advisory board, and then create an independent labor-management board of a higher
order, with limited functions in disputes as suggested in my items (5) and (6). If leaders of
industry and labor would be willing to perform these functions, I think that the country would
be the gainer. The C.E.D. coolness toward this suggestion may indicate that industry, at least,
is not ready to take on such responsibilities; perhaps labor is not either.
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ments (said principles being set forth hereinafter in Part III of this Act for
the guidance of industry and labor and the information of the country) ;9
(io) To formulate (or propose or call labor-management conferences to
formulate) further statements of the principles and policies which should
govern management and labor in their collective relations, and to promulgate, distribute and encourage adherence to, the principles and policies so
formulated, considering particularly, as areas in which to seek the maximum degree of joint agreement, wage policies, measures for stabilizing
employment, and the delineation of the functions of management and
labor. xo
III. A Charter of FairLabor Practices
The principles hereinafter set forth in this Part III, having been unanimously agreed to by the President's National Labor-Management Conference of November, x945, are hereby designated as a "Charter of Fair
Labor Practices" and are declared to constitute national policy. They are
published for the information of the country and as a guide to representatives of industry and labor in collective-bargaining negotiations and in the
administration and maintenance of collective agreements. As further principles are elaborated by agreement, pursuant to paragraph io of Section E
of Part II of this act, the board hereinabove provided for may publish
them as an integral part of this Charter of Fair Labor Practices, so that
the charter shall constitute a developing document embodying at any
9 The C.E.D. proposal contains nothing comparable to items (9) and (1o) above. It seems
to me that a real step forward would be taken if Congress were to embody in statutory form, as
a sort of charter of fair labor practices-unenforcible in the courts but carrying weight nevertheless as a declaration of public policy-the principles already agreed to by the LaborManagement Conference; and further, if Congress were to call upon labor and industry,
through the medium of the joint board, to keep on developing and adding to this charter, as
in item (io).
10 These three areas-wage policies, measures for stablizing employment, and the delineation of the functions of labor and management-are the hardest and the most important for industry and labor to explore together. At the 1945 conference the first two were not considered
at all, and on the third no agreement could be reached (see pp. 43 to 73 of Vol. III of the Proceedings for an interesting clash of views which may be, however, less irreconcilable than then
appeared). The industry group, joined by the AFL representatives, opposed the request of the
CIO representatives to discuss wage policy. In the light of the strikes which thereafter followed,
it seems regrettable that not even an attempt was made to lay down standards and guides for
easing the country through the major wdge adjustments which were then inevitable. However,
price controls were still in force and the government may perhaps be criticized for not having
called upon labor and industry to meet with its own representatives to formulate a workable
wage-price policy for the transition to peace-time production. In any event, the formulation
by agreement of yardsticks and standards for wage-fixing should henceforth be at the forefront of the efforts of labor and industry. This is why I would mention it specifically in the actas a matter of emphasis-along with the other major policy questions specified above. The
C.E.D. proposal contains no comparable provisions.

A LABOR-MANAGEMENT BOARD

given time the best views of the leaders of industry and labor regarding
their mutual relationships. The initial charter shall read as follows:",
1
A. The Making of Initial Collective Agreements '
(i) Collective bargaining undertaken promptly and in good faith, following recognition of a properly established bargaining agent either by
acceptance by the employer or by operation of lawfully constituted procedures, is viewed as the first step to avoid strike action by the union or
refusal to bargain by the employer.
Observance of the following widely applicable rules will contribute to
orderly and peaceful procedures in making the first contract:
(a) The employer should not question his obligation to bargain with the union chosen
as the bargaining agent for all employees in a properly established bargaining unit.
(b) Neither side should delay immediate establishment of bargaining relationships
and commencement of contract negotiations.
(c) In their negotiations, the parties should look toward the preparation of a signed
agreement covering a defined period of time.
(d) Before specific bargaining on individual items is undertaken, each party should
present to the other a general statement of its position and the parties should then
explore them jointly. Areas of agreement should be carefully sought. Precise
definition of the issues also should precede specific bargaining. In consummating
their first agreement, the parties should carefully define its scope and terms.
(e) It is well that respect and consideration be given to proposals presented by either
the employer or the union and every reasonable effort made to bring about accord
before any unreasonable ultimatum is issued by either side. Both sides should
avoid inflammatory statements which question the sincerity or good faith of the
other party.
(f) Both parties should avoid threats or actions which interfere with normal operain good faith and until all other peacetions while negotiations are still proceeding
3
ful procedures have been exhausted.'
(2) Conciliation should be employed by the parties if collective bargaining has not resulted in agreement. Such conciliation may be private or
public, and if public, local, state or federal, as best suited to the circumstances.
Conciliation, however, should not be the first resort of parties, but
should be undertaken only after reasonable time and full effort to reach
agreement has been made by direct negotiation.
" What follows has been taken verbatim, from pp. X29-31, 141-43, and 32, of Volume III
of the Proceedings of the Conference.
- This is the first formulation of principles in the labor field ever agreed to by leading
representatives of industry and labor. The reasonable and common sense nature of these
principles should not obscure the great advance marked by their formulation. Before the war
no such agreement could conceivably have been reached.
13 These six principles, if given support by Congress, should be of considerable assistance
to mediators, as well as to the parties themselves.
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The conciliator should, wherever possible, be invited by both parties to
participate. If that is not possible, the best practice is for the party inviting the conciliator to notify the other party of this action.
(3) If direct negotiations and conciliation have not been successful,
voluntary arbitration may be considered by the parties; however, before
voluntary arbitration is agreed upon as a means of settling unsettled issues, the parties themselves should agree on the precise issues, the terms
of submission, and the principles or factors by which the arbitrator shall
4
be governed.'
B. The Administration of Collective Agreements
(i) Collective-bargaining agreements should contain provisions that
grievances and disputes involving the interpretation or application of the
terms of the agreement are to be settled without resort to strikes, lockouts
or other interruptions to normal operations by an effective grievance procedure with arbitration as its final step..5

-

'4 The limited use of arbitration for the settlement of contract terms (as distinguished from
the interpretationof contract terms already agreed to, which is discussed in the section immediately following) is due just to this difficulty, namely, of agreeing upon the "principles or factors
by which the arbitrator shall be governed." Employers and unions hesitate to commit to an
"outsider" the fixing of contract terms where his frame of reference is very broad. (All the
more so are they opposed to compulsory references in such circumstances.) When the arbitrator is given rules or standards by adherence to which he cannot go very far wrong, one way or
the other, the parties are much more apt to be willing to entrust their fates to him. One of the
most successful arbitrators in the country, who for years has set the annual wage-scales in a
particular industry, once told me that the parties were willing to let him do this only because
he made it a practice to explore the true necessities of each side in a series of separate, private,
off-the-record conferences, and because he would not proceed to a judgment until he was satisfied that he understood about where the breaking-point of each side lay, so that if he hit somewhere in between the result would be bearable. A procedure of this sort, however, could be
successful only under exceptional conditions; it would call for an unusual degree of personal
confidence in the arbitrator and of shrewdness, tact, and wide knowledge of the industry on
his part. In most cases these conditions are not all present, and since they are not, it becomes
particularly important in the wage field (which is the most difficult to arbitrate) for industry
and labor to formulate by agreement yardsticks and limiting principles for the guidance of
arbitrators. Not nearly enough effort has been put into this undertaking, and its importance
cannot be exaggerated.
This agreement upon arbitration as the final step in grievance procedures marks one of
the great war-time gains in labor relations. Before the war the practice was very limited and
was strongly resisted. During the war the vital necessity of maintaining uninterrupted production led to a new interest in procedures for settling grievances and day-to-day disputes within
plants. On February 28, i944, the industry, labor and public members of the National War
Labor Board unanimously adopted a resolution calling upon employers and unions "to install
adequate procedures for the prompt, just, and final settlement of the day-to-day grievances
involving the interpretation and application of the contract"; "to make the full functioning of
the grievance procedure a major responsibility under the no-strike no-lockout agreement for
maximum production to win the war"; and, "even in the absence of established grievance procedures, to settle grievances through direct negotiation and, if necessary, voluntary arbitration." Subsequent pronouncements and actions of the board developed further the concept
and practice of arbitration under grievance procedures, so that by the time the war had ended
a really significant change had occurred in the thinking of both industry and unions with regard
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(2) To be effective, the procedure established for the settlement of such
grievances and disputes should meet at least the following standards:

(a) The successive steps in the procedure, the method of presenting grievances or disputes, and the method of taking an appeal from one step to another should be so
clearly stated in the agreement as to be readily understood by all employees,
union officials, and management representatives.
(b) The procedure should be adaptable to the handling of the various types of grievances and disputes which come under the terms of the agreement.
(c) The procedure should be designed to facilitate the settlement of grievances and
disputes as soon as possible after they arise. To this end:
i. The agreement should provide adequate stated time limits for the presentation
of grievances and disputes, the rendering of decisions and the taking of appeals;
2. Issues should be clearly formulated at the earliest possible moment. In all cases
which cannot be settled in the first informal discussions, the positions of both
sides should be reduced to writing;
3. Management and union should encourage their representatives to settle at the
lower steps grievances which do not involve broad questions of policy or of contract interpretation and should delegate sufficient authority to them to accomplish this end;
4. The agreement should provide adequate opportunity for both parties to investigate grievances under discussion;
5. Provision should be made for priority handling of grievances involving discharge, suspension, or other disciplinary action.
(d) The procedure should be open to the submission of grievances by all parties to the
agreement.

(3) Management and unions should inform and train their representatives in the proper functioning of the grievance procedure and in their
responsibilities under it. In such a program it should be emphasized:
(a) That the basic objective of the grievance procedure is the achievement of sound
and fair settlements and not the "winning" of cases.
(b) That the filing of grievances should be considered by foremen or supervisors as
aids in discovering and removing causes of discontent in their departments.
(c) That any tendency by either party to support the earlier decisions of its representatives when such decisions are wrong should be discouraged.
to the settlement of grievances through arbitration. This method now came to be looked upon
by many influential employers and unions as normal and indeed indispensable. It remained for
the 1945 conference to give to these views a formal and impressive backing. It is important to
note the essential difference between arbitration under an existing contract and arbitration of
the terms to be embodied in a new contract. In the former case the arbitrator is merely interpreting and applying the parties' own language; in the latter case he is making a contract for
them. In the former case his scope is narrowly confined, so that even if he makes mistakes he
cannot go very far afield; in the latter case, in the absence of agreed-upon yardsticks and limitations, his discretion is unfettered and he may do real damage to one side or the other through
ignorance or misunderstanding. For these reasons arbitration of new contract terms has
made relatively little headway, while arbitration of grievances under existing contracts is
rapidly becoming universal.
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(d) That the willingness of management and union officials to give adequate time and
attention to the handling and disposition of grievances and disputes is necessary
to the effective functioning of the procedure.
(e) That for the sound handling of grievances and disputes both management and
union representatives should be thoroughly familiar with the entire collective
bargaining agreement.
(4) The parties should provide by mutual agreement for the final determination of any unsettled grievances or disputes involving the interpretation or application of the agreement by an impartial chairman, umpire,
arbitrator, or board. In this connection the agreement should provide:
(a) A definite and mutually agreed upon procedure of selecting the impartial chairman,
umpire, arbitrator, or board.
(b) That the impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator, or board should have no power
to add to, subtract from, change, or modify any provision of the agreement but
should be authorized only to interpret the existing provisions of the agreement and
apply them to the specific facts of the grievance or dispute.
(c) That reference of a grievance or dispute to an impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator, or board should be reserved as the final step in the procedure and should
not be resorted to unless the settlement procedures of the earlier steps have been
exhausted.
(d) That the decision of the impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator, or board should
be accepted by both parties as final and binding.
(e) That the cost of such impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator, or board should be
shared equally by both parties.

(5) Any question not involving the application or interpretation of the
agreement as then existing but which may properly be raised pursuant to
agreement provisions should be subject to negotiation, conciliation, or such
other means of settlement as the parties may provide.
(6) Where an agreement contains a renewal clause and a change or
modification or reopening of the agreement is requested by either party or
where the existing agreement is about to be terminated, ample time prior
to the termination of the agreement should be provided for the negotiation of a new or modified agreement. If such negotiations should fail, the
parties should make early use of conciliation, mediation, and, where
mutually agreed to, arbitration.
6
C. The Maintenance of Collective Agreements
(i) The customary provisions incorporated in collective-bargaining
agreements which permit management to discipline any employees subject to their right to appeal through the grievance machinery of the agree16This section, in a few crisp sentences, codifies two more highly significant gains in labormanagement thinking: (i) the importance and necessity of management's right to discipline,
and the correlative right of the disciplined employee to appeal his penalty through the griev-
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ment for any violation of its provisions are desirable and necessary for the
proper administration of the agreement.
(2) Management and unions must require that their respective officials
refrain from encouraging or engaging in contract violation. The parties
must establish and enforce such regulations as may be necessary within
their respective jurisdictions to insure absolute unqualified adherence to
the contract commitment made.
III
I have presented the foregoing draft of an Act of Congress not because
I thought its details important, but because it embodies, and therefore
may help some people to visualize more clearly, what I believe to be the
basic principles of a sound labor program, namely:
(i) That, in a democracy such as ours, fundamental progress toward
the avoidance and peaceful settlement of industrial conflicts can only be
made by agreement between industry and labor upon policies and procedures designed to buttress collective bargaining and to make it work
more effectively and without serious breakdowns;
(2) That the establishment of a continuing, organized relationship between the leaders of industry and labor holds out the best hope of furthering agreement along these lines;
(3) That as a practical matter the establishment of such a relationship
can only be effected by the government, and that the government should
lend every aid to bringing it about and maintaining it, while continuing
to mediate in the field; and
(4) That the government should, in addition, capitalize upon the significant agreements heretofore reached by the leaders of industry and labor, by publishing them in statutory form, not as compulsory edicts but
as a charter of fair labor practices constituting national policy; after which
the leaders of industry and labor should be charged with responsibility, in
their continuing, organized relationships, for further developing and adding to this charter.
I do not hold out these four principles as panaceas. I do not believe that
in a free-market economy such as we are trying to maintain we can altogether avoid situations in which workers, emulating the price policies of
other producers, will withhold their services in order to raise or maintain
ance procedure after the discipline has been imposed (any remissions of penalties being made
retroactive); (2) the importance and necessity of adhering to contracts, and the positive
obligation resting on both parties to co-operate to that end. These convictions, which had begun to take shape before the war, were greatly strengthened by the war-time need of maximum
production.
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the price of their labor. The best we can hope for is to minimize the interruptions by agreement.
And I think it important to add, in conclusion, that labor relations do
not exist in a vacuum. They are deeply affected by what happens to the
country generally, just as the country's welfare is deeply affected by what
happens to the world at large. If we can so manage our affairs, at home
and abroad, as to give people hope, and a sense of security, and an opportunity to develop their talents and to build a decent life for themselves
and their children, the collective-bargaining process will work well; but
if we fail in these endeavors, the collective-bargaining process, like the
peace of mankind, can only deteriorate.

